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Abstract 
The articulation of international and transnational terrorism as a key issue in US security 
policy, as a result of the 9/11 attacks, has not only led to a policy rethink, it has also included 
a bureaucratic shift within the US, showing a re-thinking of the role of borders within US 
security policy. Drawing substantively on the ‘securitisation’ approach to security studies, the 
article analyses the discourse of US security in order to examine the founding of the 
Department of Homeland Security, noting that its mission provides a new way of providing 
‘borders’ for US national security. The securitisation of terrorism is therefore not only 
represented by marking terrorism as a security issue, it is also solidified in the organisation of 
security policy-making within the US state. As such, the impact of a ‘war on terror’ provides 
an important moment for analysing the re-articulation of what security is in the US, and, in 
theoretical terms, for reaffirming the importance of a relationship between the production of 
threat and the institutionalisation of threat response.  
 
 
The creation of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was a monumental act of 
restructuring of the architecture of US government. The creation of the DHS involved an 
enormous reorganization of government bureaucracy: consolidating 22 government agencies 
involving 180,000 employees, for the purpose of, as President Bush stated, ‘ensuring that our 
efforts to defend this country are comprehensive and united’ (Bush, 2002). Often compared 
in its scope to the National Security Act of 1947,2 the DHS also promised to have as 
important an impact in defining US security in the future.3 While not a lone institutional 
feature of the ‘war on terror’, it was and remains the new ‘home front’. In essence, the 9/11 
attacks have led to the reformulation of the ‘national security state’, possibly beyond what the 
architects of the National Security Act would have imagined (or desired).  
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The impact of a ‘war on terror’ is important in many ways for scholars of international 
relations: for what it means generally for international security, for the kinds of changes that 
have been implemented in US grand strategy, and for specific analyses of the efficacy of anti-
terror policy making. However, it is also an important moment for analysing the re-
articulation of what security is in the US, and, in theoretical terms, for reaffirming the 
importance of a relationship between the production of threat and the institutionalisation of 
threat response.  
When external threat is linked to monumental (and often catastrophic) events, it can lead 
to historical openings for the rearticulating of security. Although this is in some ways quite 
obvious, the particular ways in which threat is produced, or securitised, in these moments 
also can lead to the re-articulation of security actors (i.e. those that have the power to respond 
to threats) through the institutionalisation of a particular response to threat. That is to say that 
actors in security policy-making in various governmental bureaucracies can have 
fundamental shifts in the way security is approached as a result of institutionalising new ways 
of framing security. As such, the articulation of international and transnational terrorism as a 
key issue in US security policy, as a result of the 9/11 attacks, has not only led to a policy 
rethink, it has also included a bureaucratic shift within the US, showing a re-thinking of the 
role of borders within US security policy. The securitisation of terrorism is therefore not only 
represented by marking terrorism as a security issue, it is also solidified in the organisation of 
security policy-making within the US state. 
The article will further this argument in three stages. First, the analyses of the 
conventional discourse of security studies concerning 9/11 will be briefly examined, in order 
to provide a critique that brings ideational factors back in. The account here draws 
substantively on the ‘securitisation’ approach (Buzan, Waever and De Wilde, 1998), though 
with some modifications to better theorise the institutionalisation of threat. Second, the 
discourse of US security will be examined in order to look at the way in which the moment of 
9/11 became folded into the discourse of US security, drawing from past experience, but also 
in an attempt to move beyond the Cold War national security state. Finally, the founding of 
the DHS will be discussed, especially in terms of how its mission provides a new way of 
 3 
providing ‘borders’ for US national security. The 9/11 attacks on the United States provided 
an opportunity for a redefining of national security in the US, that institutionally manifested 
itself in the DHS. While previously threats to the US were seen as external, the terrorist 
attacks showed the risk inherent in increasing transnationalism, which allowed for the 
institutionalisation of the protection of borders through policing measures, in addition to the 
well-known and controversial moves towards the pre-emptive use of military force. 
Constructing Threats, Building Institutions 
Two main views have dominated the conventional security discourse on the 9/11 attacks: that 
nothing has changed; or that external threats require internal policy changes. The first view 
was made by a number of prominent realists, attempting to put the events of 9/11 into a 
broader historical perspective.4 The problem with this view is that it misses both the symbolic 
and discursive value of the action: that is, in a sense, it is important because people believe it 
to be, and treat it as if it is. In a broader manner, it is a shortcoming of the realist theory to not 
take internal changes in policy very seriously: for realists it is really relations between states 
that matter, and not the specific policies one state enacts. The second view takes the events 
seriously as a turning point, and is more focused on policy options. In this view, the 9/11 
events have shown the materialisation of a dramatic new threat, and thus needs new 
responses. The main problem with this approach is that it refuses to show how such actions 
are discursively constituted and also have broader institutional contexts in their formulation.  
Constructivism has challenged conventional approaches to international security by 
adding a normative dimension: that ideational factors constitute social relations (e.g. Farrell, 
2000; Hopf, 1998; Katzenstein, 1996; c.f. Guzzini, 2000; Weldes et al. 1999). Constructivist 
approaches to security studies have mainly dealt with the creation and influence of 
international norms, at either the international or domestic level. In terms of the former, they 
have shown how the shared ideas of state actors shape the practice of international relations: 
for example in terms of how shared beliefs about nuclear weapons have created an effective 
‘nuclear taboo’; or how notions of community have created areas of inter-state relations 
where there is little chance of war (Tannenwald, 1999; Adler and Barnett, 1998). The latter 
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group of scholars have mainly pointed to the development of ‘national styles’ or approaches 
to security, exemplified by the rich studies of military organisational cultures, and studies of 
national strategic cultures (Berger, 1996; Johnston, 1995; Kier, 1996; cf. Desch, 1998).  
Overall, the question of agency in such studies has been underdeveloped, despite claims 
about the ‘mutual constitution’ of agents and structures, which hinders the analysis.5 As 
Checkel notes, ‘constructivists, despite their arguments about mutually constituting agents 
and structures, have advanced a structure-centred approach in their empirical work’ (1999: 
342). The structural nature of the work has manifested itself in the study of norms which 
structure actors’ behaviour. While important, the study of security norms has ignored the 
ways in which actors construct ideas about what threats are, and what security itself is.  
The hallmark of the ‘Copenhagen School’ has been a close understanding of the process 
of creating discursive constructions of threat, while also conveying a rich understanding of 
agency, potentially not just confined to states. (Buzan et al., 1998; Waever, 1995; Waever et 
al., 1993). The ‘securitisation’ approach put forward by the Copenhagen school primarily 
examines the manner in which threats are identified and responded to. The key to the 
approach is how discursive moves by ‘securitising actors’ bring a perceived threat out of the 
area of normal politics and into the area of security, where it is seen as a kind of ‘emergency 
measure’: ‘the invocation of security has been the key to legitimising the use of force, but 
more generally it has opened the way for the state to mobilize, or to take special powers, to 
handle existential threats’ (Buzan et al., 1998: 21).6 Overall, the securitisation approach sees 
the identification of security threats as an intersubjective process, highlighting the influence 
of ideational factors on policy-making. The importance of highlighting the role of ideas in 
such a manner is to show that the belief in a particular discourse of threat can lead to the 
implementation of measures to deal with the threat, regardless of whether the threat is 
objective or not.7 
While securitisation theory contains a number of important insights, a real shortcoming 
arises from the inability to distinguish between different types of threats and their possible 
impacts. A distinction is proposed here between what we can refer to as threat objects and 
threat ideas, where objects refer to specific ‘things’ (e.g. terrorism), and ideas refer to the 
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broader context (e.g. international structure).8 Overall, the category of ideas is meant to 
convey a response to a broader context, that may necessitate the institutionalisation of new 
security actors, those who have the power to make securitising moves within a specific 
political context. It is in this sense a distinct type of securitisation. More broadly, the role of 
ideas in this context changes from being immanent to transcendent, in that the causal role of 
ideational power moves from reproducing the institutional status quo, to transforming it 
(Mann, 1986: 22-24). 
Such a distinction seems crucial in explaining the broader context of securitisation, and 
especially in terms of how the securitisation of broad contexts often becomes 
institutionalised. Buzan et al. do discuss how persistent threats tend to become 
institutionalised, and this is especially prominent in the military sector, ‘where states have 
long endured threats of armed coercion or invasion and in response have built up standing 
bureaucracies, procedures and military establishments to deal with those threats’ (Buzan et 
al., 1998: 27-28). However, this does not mean that these are not securitised, for in a sense 
that they have become normalised. They were most likely first established through a 
securitising move, and are often continuously justified through the discourse of security 
(Buzan et al., 1998: 28). The recognition of this entrenched securitisation is important, as it 
shows attention to not just specific threats, but also to a broader threat environment; e.g. the 
general threat of armed attack versus a specific type of attack. It is precisely this area that 
becomes important in the case of transforming security bureaucracies, and deserves more 
discussion. 
The creation of new state security institutions, and their reproduction, is dependent to a 
certain extent on the existence of a discourse about their necessity and actual role.9 While 
state theorists have pointed to important elements in terms of understanding the relationship 
between the state and the international and domestic realms (Hobson, 2000), there is a need 
for a better understanding of the role of ideas. As Hay states, ‘ideas often hold the key to 
unlock political dynamics – as change in policy is often preceded by changes in the ideas 
informing policy and as the ability to orchestrate shifts in societal preferences may play a 
crucial role in quickening the pace, altering the trajectory or raising the stakes of institutional 
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reform’ (Hay, 2002: 194). In these instances, it is not just that interests get pursued in 
different ways, it is that interests themselves become redefined. 
Normal bouts of securitisation are usually contained within a particular discursive 
framework of what constitutes danger, and how this can be responded to. Despite 
securitisation moves being seen as moving beyond ‘normal’ politics, they still can represent 
particular procedural reactions to specified dangers. However, in exceptional circumstances, 
such understandings can be effectively challenged, leading to new discursive mappings of the 
security environment. Such openings often occur in moments of momentous change or 
uncertainty (Goldstein and Keohane, 1993; Ikenberry, 1993, 2001). It is in these moments 
when the possibility for a new discursive mapping of the international realm is most likely, 
leading to a securitisation of a new threat environment. As Hay points out, ‘ideas provide the 
point of mediation between actors and their environment’ (Hay, 2002: 209-210). As such, 
exceptional moments can lead to reformulations by and restructuring of security actors within 
the state, which can also lead to an overall change and institutionalisation of what security is 
within that state. Such institutionalisation, materially manifested in the security bureaucracy, 
sets the context within which security policy can be formulated, setting distinct limits on both 
thinking and responses. As such, institutions can develop their own ‘logics of 
appropriateness’ which provide the boundaries within which actors can operate (March and 
Olsen, 1994, 1998).  
The development of a deep institutionalisation of a particular securitised threat leads over 
time to a reification of a particular kind of state, which is geared institutionally towards 
specific ways of both deciding what is a threat and responding to threats. The 
institutionalisation of securitisation also leads to its normalisation. As Goldstein and Keohane 
point out, ‘once ideas have influenced institutional design, their influence will be reflected in 
the incentives of those in the organization and those whose interests are served by it’ 
(Goldstein and Keohane, 1993: 20). For example, when states are institutionally geared 
towards militarised competition, as the US and Soviet Union were during the Cold War, these 
‘extreme measures’ become institutionalised, and therefore become normalised.10   
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Overall, the manner in which security actors are identified needs to be expanded to better 
understand the process of securitisation at the state level, better appreciate the connections 
between state, society and the international, and to comprehend the process of the 
institutionalisation and reproduction of security actors and security bureaucracies. State 
security bureaucracies play a powerful role in institutionalising ideas about the scope of 
security, and can, in the long-term, both change the idea of the ideology of national security 
and how it is pursued. The following section operationalises this expanded understanding of 
securitisation, by examining the impact of 9/11 on the creation of the Department of 
Homeland Security. 
9/11 and the Discourse of US Security 
The security environment in the US in the 1940s was heavily defined by the events at Pearl 
Harbor on December 7, 1941 (which President Roosevelt described as ‘a date which will live 
in infamy’). Discussions in Congress regarding the unification of the armed services often 
were accompanied by calls to ‘remember Pearl Harbor’ (Hogan, 1998). When the new 
dimension of Soviet-US relations was added to this mix, the institutionalisation of the 
national security state was not far off. Kennan’s Long Telegram, the Truman Doctrine, etc., 
all coalesced into an antagonistic security discourse that framed the external security 
environment in the context of what had become a major historical opening. ‘Remember Pearl 
Harbor’ so that we will not get caught out again. By the mid-1940s, the Soviet Union became 
the potential competitor who might provide another surprise (Gaddis, 1987). The fusion of 
civil-military functions found in the 1947 National Security Act, and the resultant security 
complex found in the National Security Council and (eventually) the Department of Defense, 
proved themselves able to the task, producing one of the defining strategic documents of the 
Cold War, NSC-68, in 1950.  
The early Cold War provides a demonstration of how a symbolic event can be utilised to 
inform the securitisation process. Pearl Harbor, and its connotations of surprise, unreadiness, 
and lack of organisation, were utilised to frame the context relations with the Soviet Union, 
which helped in the creation of new security actors, and a new discourse of US security. 
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Additionally both of these key events played into a longer-term narrative concerning the 
perceived invulnerability of American borders; as Gaddis explains, ‘the American ideal . . . 
had been to insulate domestic life from a violent external world’ (Gaddis, 2004: 9; c.f. 
Leffler, 2003). While making comparisons between historical moments can often be risky, 
two features are important: one is the explicit linkages made to this past by policy makers in 
terms of lessons of the past; second, and more abstractly, is the relationship between the 
security discourse and the creation of security institutions. The former will be taken further 
here, while the latter will be taken up in the next section. 
Linking 9/11 to a discourse of securitisation is not difficult. The events themselves were 
horrific, and had the added impact of being continually repeated on television, embedding 
them in the public consciousness.11 As Morgan points out, in a similar vein, ‘in the past, 
planning and preparations for armed conflict seemed implicitly to assume that US territory 
would remain a sanctuary. Shattering a complacent sense of invulnerability, the bombing 
moved these threats to salience in the public perception’ (Morgan, 2004: 11). The 9/11 
Commission also drew the parallel to Pearl Harbor, especially focussing in on how it was 
possibly even worse: 
While by no means as threatening as Japan’s act of war, the 9/11 attack was in 
some ways more devastating. It was carried out by a tiny group of people, not 
enough to man a full platoon. Measured on a governmental scale, the 
resources behind it were trivial. The group itself was dispatched by an 
organization based in one of the poorest, most remote, and least industrialized 
countries on earth. This organization recruited a mixture of young fanatics and 
highly educated zealots who could not find suitable places in their home 
societies or were driven from them (9/11 Commission, 2004: 339-340). 
Further focusing on statements from the Executive branch, it can be easily shown that 
9/11 not only became crucial in a securitisation process concerning terrorism, it also 
solidified the idea of a new environment of threat, that would need unprecedented kinds of 
action, including the types of emergency measures described by the securitisation approach, 
but also the development of new security institutions. In a powerful and uncompromising 
address to a joint session of Congress and the nation on September 20, 2001, President Bush 
explicitly appealed to the event framed in terms of the uniqueness of the event:  
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on September the 11th, enemies of freedom committed an act of war against 
our country. Americans have known wars – but for the past 136 years, they 
have been wars on foreign soil, except for one Sunday in 1941. Americans 
have known the casualties of war – but not at the center of a great city on a 
peaceful morning. Americans have known surprise attacks – but never before 
on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us on a single day – 
and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom itself is under 
attack (Bush, 2001).  
This statement, very much captures the sentiment of surprise, the comparison to Pearl Harbor, 
their almost unprecedented nature, and the continuing sense of danger and threat. 
The nature of the attacks therefore required a new kind of response. Up until that point, 
the threat of the ‘new’ terrorism had been folded into existing security discourses and 
procedures.12 However, as President Bush continued,  
our response involves far more than instant retaliation and isolated strikes. 
Americans should not expect one battle, but a lengthy campaign, unlike any 
other we have seen. It may include dramatic strikes, visible on TV, and covert 
operations, secret even in success. . . And we will pursue nations that provide 
aid or safe haven to terrorism. Every nation, in every region, now has a 
decision to make. Either you are with us, or you are against us (Bush, 2001).  
The identification of new means and ends, new ways of conducting international relations, all 
fit in with the move to ‘emergency’ measures. 
One of the most important measures, however, came in the institutionalisation of the 
domestic response. In the Speech to congress, President Bush announced the creation of an 
executive level position, the Office of Homeland Security. While initially a ‘terrorism Czar’, 
the position a year later became the head of a newly organised US government bureaucracy, 
through the Homeland Security Act. As President Bush stated at the signing of the Act, 
‘today, we are taking historic action to defend the United States and protect our citizens 
against the dangers of a new era’ (Bush, 2002). Repeating the idea of a new era and new 
environment of security, the President continued:  
We’re fighting a new kind of war against determined enemies. And public 
servants long into the future will bear the responsibility to defend Americans 
against terror. This administration and this Congress have the duty of putting 
that system into place. We will fulfil that duty. With the Homeland Security 
Act, we’re doing everything we can to protect America. We’re showing the 
resolve of this great nation to defend our freedom, our security and our way of 
life (Bush, 2002).  
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The official discourse of 9/11 and the resultant ‘war on terror’ effectively securitised not 
only international terrorism, but a new environment of security. 9/11 symbolically fulfilled 
the role that Pearl Harbor did 60 years previously: to warn Americans of the dangers of a new 
era, of a new environment of threat. Such an environment required a new response, and 
effectively, a new concept of security. As the President stated, ‘we recognize our greatest 
security is found in the relentless pursuit of these cold-blooded killers. Yet, because terrorists 
are targeting America, the front of the new war is here in America. Our life has changed and 
changed in dramatic fashion on September the 11th, 2001’ (Bush, 2002). 
The audience did not need much convincing of the salience of the threat of terrorism. The 
impassioned speeches by Bush certainly changed the perception of a foreign policy novice, 
who had also seemed overawed at the moment of the attacks. The repeated airing of the 
attacks on TV helped to further dramatise and provide a constant reproduction of the symbol 
of threat. As such, the audience of securitisation, both in government and out, were not a hard 
case, and ‘emergency measures’ certainly seemed appropriate in light of events.13 This is not 
to say that the specific response – a ‘war on terror’ based on pre-emption and heightened 
homeland security – was the only response. What is important is that the legitimation of the 
new discourse of security focused on terrorism easily allowed for a new policy response that 
was further institutionalised through a restructuring of the security bureaucracy of the US 
state.   
 
The Department of Homeland Security and the Global Risk Environment 
The creation of the DHS was, as stated in the introduction, a major restructuring of the 
architecture of the US government.14  Prior to 9/11, there was little motivation to reform the 
Cold War security system, as institutional inertia and the lack of a massive external threat led 
to the continuation of what already seemed to be working. As Stuart suggests, ‘absent a crisis 
comparable to Pearl Harbour, the American people were content to focus on their 401k’s and 
stock options’ (Stuart, 2003: 306-307). Although there had been a number of adjustments to 
the network of security institutions, such as the Goldwater-Nichols reform of the Department 
of Defense (Locher, 2003), and President Clinton’s creation of a National Economic Council 
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(NEC) which mirrored the NSC in organisation, security arrangements still had a distinctly 
Cold War flavour.  
The DHS itself was created to integrate numerous diverse agencies that provided aspects 
of ‘homeland security’, such as immigration, border controls, disaster management, Coast 
Guard and intelligence.15 The focus on transnational actors (especially terrorist groups) as 
security threats exemplifies this changing idea of security within the US security community. 
The identification of transnational threats preceded 9/11, seen in a variety of activities, from 
President Reagan’s ‘war on drugs’ to President Clinton’s focus on transnational crime 
(Andreas, 2003). However, the creation of the DHS radically alerted the institutionalisation 
of these efforts, integrating a number of the organisations already involved in the security 
effort of transnational actors (such as the Coast Guard, Customs Service and INS), and by 
emphasising the focus on terrorism (Andreas, 2003: 92). As the 9/11 Commission put it, 
‘9/11 has taught us that terrorism against American interests “over there” should be regarded 
just as we regard terrorism against America “over here.” In this same sense, the American 
homeland is the planet’ (2004: 362).  
Moving from the official discourse to the academic, one of the more interesting ways that 
this environment of global insecurity has been characterised is as a ‘world risk society’. Risk, 
according to Beck, means ‘the modern approach to foresee and control the future 
consequences of human action’ (Beck, 1999: 3; c.f. Boyne, 2003). In this sense, risk is 
mainly about knowing the possible consequences of actions, and trying to control them. The 
argument is that globalisation has increased the intensity and scope of risk. These risks can 
range from the extremely local (e.g. ontological insecurity of the self) to the global (e.g. risks 
of nuclear war) (Giddens, 1990). 
Coker uses the sociological literature on risk to illuminate the contemporary world of 
security and insecurity: ‘risk increasingly determines the discourse of security’ (Coker, 2002: 
60). The importance of this thinking is that it demonstrates how risk and insecurity is more 
and more perceived to be occurring at a global level. The problems society faces are no 
longer just part of their immediate community. As Coker states, ‘globalisation has drawn us 
out of our self-contained national or local communities into a larger world that offers none of 
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the old protections’ (Coker, 2002: 59). Overall, viewing the world as a risk community shows 
the broadest possible meaning of a globalisation of security, demonstrating that risk (and 
danger?) is part of the world we live in. 
The terrorist attacks on 9/11 have been intimately connected with globalised risk. For 
example, Cronin argues that the context of globalisation has resulted in the exploitation of 
new methods of terror: ‘important changes in terrorist methods are apparent in the use of new 
technologies, the movement of terrorist groups across international boundaries, and changes 
in the sources of support’ (Cronin, 2003: 46; c.f. Adamson, 2006; Tirman, 2004). The 
identification of a new context of threat that fits into ideas about globalisation and risk, was 
crucial to the refashioning of the security discourse. This was especially clear concerning new 
ideas about the role of borders. 
In traditional approaches to security, which are defined by realism, borders are crucial to 
security: threat is externalised, and the significance of borders is the protection of the 
territorial state.16 While this position on security has great importance, it does not recognise 
the possibility that such ideas about security change over time. As Andreas summarises, ‘as a 
result, there is a widening gap between the traditional realist conception of security of borders 
and what many states are actually doing in the realm of security and border defences’ 
(Andreas, 2003: 82). The move away from defining the borders of security in terms of 
military threat, or just in terms of preparation for war, moved towards a redefinition of 
borders and security in terms of policing and transnational law. With the continuing relevance 
of globalisation, in terms of creating a global risk environment, the actual practices of 
security have moved away from this highly militarised concept of security, towards what 
could only be described as policing (Andreas and Price, 2001). This is not to say that military 
security has become irrelevant, but in advanced industrial democracies, interstate war has 
become less relevant, and militaries are increasingly becoming more like police forces.  
The connections to globalisation go deeper than just concerning protection from terrorism  
The problems the DHS faces are reshaping borders as filters, in order to allow the beneficial 
movements of the products of economic globalisation (be they shipped goods or movements 
of people) while excluding the ‘undesired’ (Flynn, 2003; c.f. Naim, 2005). Overall, the DHS 
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has played a major role in institutionalising the new risk environment, at its most basic 
defined by the context of globalisation and the movement of people and goods across 
borders. While this necessitates a re-inscription of borders as barriers, it also adds a 
dimension. As Bigo points out, ‘security is not only a state affair, it is a boundary function’ 
(Bigo, 2001: 91; c.f. Biersteker, 2003). However, instead of seeing borders as solid barriers, 
that can be easily guarded from external threats, in a global risk environment security is 
everywhere.  
Conclusion 
The creation of the Department of Homeland Security should be taken quite seriously as 
providing a shift in the discourse of security, and in the overall perception in the US 
concerning what security fundamentally is. While the creation of the DHS has not put an end 
to the pursuit of national security through military means, the broad context of security has 
shifted to come to terms with the context of a global risk environment. That such an 
environment requires a new policy approach to the pursuit of security is no surprise. In the 
broad context of the actual implementation of security, risk management and policing 
functions are becoming more prominent in dealing with the context of globalisation. The 
securitisation and subsequent institutionalisation of this new environment of threat is of 
utmost importance for security analysts. 
However, there is also a real paradox here: as military and policing functions become 
more and more alike, the war on terror tends to be discussed in a very old-fashioned manner,  
even if the real frontline against terrorism is not through conventional conflict (e.g. the 
Afghan war, or even the Iraq war), but through intelligence efforts to close down terrorist 
finance channels, or through the policing of borders through the DHS.17 The rhetoric of war 
is odd in this respect, except in terms of the way in which it helps to mobilise society, or  puts 
the new threats on very familiar grounds.18 The connection of the Bush administration’s 
foreign and defence policy team with more traditional realist visions of security may be an 
important aspect here (Daalder and Lindsey, 2003). An example of this realism can be seen in 
a comparison of the security strategies of Presidents Bush and Clinton: the National Security 
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Strategy of 2002 does not mention ‘globalization’, whereas the previous document, President 
Clinton’s ‘A National Security Strategy for a Global Age’ made 19 references to the concept 
(White House, 2000; White House, 2002).19  
The move towards a new concept of security has not been without its costs, especially in 
terms of the state-society relationship. In yet another parallel with the early Cold War, it has 
led to a resurrection of the ‘garrison state’ thesis proposed by Harold Lasswell in the 1950s 
(Lasswell, 1977). While Lasswell’s extreme predictions about the concentration of specialists 
of violence in government did not come true, the idea of a state that is mainly led by its 
military (concerns) is still important. As Morgan points out, ‘the nexus between civil defence, 
military force, and disaster response have led to the fulfilment of Lasswell’s argument that 
specialists of violence will train in skills that we have traditionally accepted as part of modern 
civilian management’ (Morgan, 2004: 7). The creation of the DHS, in combination with 
legislation such as the USA-Patriot Act, have led to real concerns over the influence of the 
state on domestic freedom; also a concern about the influence of military concerns on politics 
and policy, as military-civilian relations have taken a new turn. The severe concentration of 
power that conservatives had warned against with the National Security Act have now been 
deepened, especially in the context of a ‘war on terror’: ‘there is a striking similarity between 
his central theoretical problem and the practical problems of sustaining civil liberties while 
facing the challenge of an active crisis of national security with no apparent end’ (Morgan, 
2004: 7). 
While the Cold War national security state, led by the institutional reforms of the 
National Security Act, did not lead to Lasswell’s garrison state (mainly due to anti-statist 
tendencies within the US),20 some of the features that were institutionalised affected the way 
security could be discussed within the US, marginalizing other approaches. However, the lag 
in thinking about security is not surprising, as even new institutions take a while to become 
embedded. The DHS has only been in existence for four years, and will continue to play a 
role in defining the borders of US security in the future. The gradual modification of military 
roles towards policing also continues apace, despite the perceived foreign and security policy 
focus on inter-state relations. Time will only tell if the legacy of the DHS is comparable to 
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the set of institutions created by the National Security Act, and whether or not those Cold 
War institutions face pressures for reform inaugurated by the challenges of globalisation. 
 
Endnotes 
 
1 I would like to thank Barrie Axford for organizing the workshop where this paper was originally presented, 
and for arranging this special issue. I would also like to thank all of the participants in the original workshop, 
and the two anonymous referees, who all provided valuable comments on the original presentation and draft. 
2 In his speech for the signing of the Act, President Bush made the connection explicit: ‘setting up the 
Department of Homeland Security will involve the most extensive reorganization of the federal government 
since Harry Truman signed the National Security Act’ (Bush, 2002). 
3 For the impact of the National Security Act, in the context of the early Cold War, see Hogan (1998).  
4 See, for example, Gray (2002). 
5 This can be seen in the bracketing off of the state that many constructivist (and mainstream) IR scholars 
engage in. For a general criticism of this tendency, see Wight (1999).  
6 There is some overlap here with Agamben’s work on the ‘state of exception’; see Agamben (2005). Along 
these lines, Williams (2003) has clearly located the thematic similarity between the ‘Copenhagen school’ and 
Carl Schmitt, especially in terms of the ‘politics of enmity, decision, and emergency which has deep roots in 
Schmitt’s understanding of political order’ (515). 
7 This is to imply that threats are ontologically intersubjective, but epistemologically objective. See Searle 
(1995) and Hacking (1999). 
8 This draws from Hacking’s discussion of social construction: Hacking (1999: 21-24). 
9 Croft (2006) has made a similar argument (also regarding 9/11) linking ideas about crisis, discourses of threat 
and institutional development. 
10  Historical institutionalists have addressed such issues through the analysis of critical junctures and 
developmental pathways: the former focusing on founding moments of institutions, the latter on feedback 
effects and evolution of institutions (Thelen, 1999; c.f. Pierson, 2004). 
11 Williams (2003) has commented on how this feature makes these events somewhat different to the past.  
12 This is not to say that there were not advocates of putting terrorism to the top of the security agenda. See, for 
example Clarke (2004). The 1999 Hart-Rudman Commission had also made similar recommendations regarding 
terrorism to those made after 9/11, such as the development of a specific department dealing with homeland 
defence. 
13 Many of these emergency measures are beginning to be questioned, particularly over the expansion of 
executive power. See the overview in Ornstein and Mann (2006). Croft (2006: chap. 5) also includes the 
development of contradictions in the consensus surrounding a crisis discourse as a crucial part of his 
explanatory model. 
14 The phrase is from Carter (2001). Croft (2006) also discussed the DHS in the context of institutionalising the 
‘war on terror’, though as one part of three aspects of institutionalisation. 
15 See the details in the DHS’ two key documents Office of Homeland Security (2002) and DHS (2004). 
16 The classic reading of security and territoriality can be found Herz (1957). Ruggie (1993) provides an 
important update. 
17 See Cronin (2002/03) for a critique of the current policy along these lines. 
18 On the problem defining the effort against terrorism as a ‘war’, see Howard (2002).   
19 It is possibly telling that the 2006 report has a whole section on the challenges of globalisation. 
20 As argued in Friedberg (2000). However, see the review of Friedberg’s book in Sherry (2003). 
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